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Abstract 
The introduction explores the politics and political economy of austerity in comparative 
perspective, setting out the context of current austerity policies and discourse in Europe.  It 
places the specific exploration of the dynamics and particularities of French austerity politics 
under Hollande within a broader context of changes since the 1980s to democratic institutions 
and electoral practices, the politics of European integration, and the conditions of complex 
economic interdependence resulting from processes of deregulation, liberalisation and 
globalisation. It establishes the rationale behind the focus of the  articles in this special issue 
on, firstly, the link between popular approval of elected politicians, democratic legitimacy 
and austerity; secondly, the politics and dynamics of state reform processes at the national 
and subnational levels which are integral to delivering on austerity-oriented commitments to 
reduce public expenditure; and thirdly, on the increasingly asymmetrical Franco-German 
relationship whose changing contours have major implications for the politics of austerity in 
Europe – notably facilitating the dominance of German ordo-liberal economic ideas at the 
heart of  Eurozone crisis responses initiatives.  
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When the global financial crisis first hit in 2008-9, settled economic ideas about appropriate 
economic policies were buffeted by sharply rising debt and deficit levels. As another ‘great 
Depression’ loomed, and the standard levers of and ideas about economic policy seemed ill-
equipped to counter it, governments of every hue embarked upon ‘unconventional’ monetary 
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policy, and embraced hitherto frowned upon Keynesian ideas about fiscal stimulus. As the 
global financial crisis morphed into the European sovereign debt crisis from 2010 onwards, 
the prevailing economic ideas underwent a further transformation. Austerity and fiscal 
consolidation became the pervasive policy prescriptions of the age, in particular in Europe, 
given the ongoing Euro-zone crisis.  
Key sources of authoritative opinion on economic policy in Europe – notably the European 
Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB) and the German Government, remain 
convinced of the merits, and necessity of austerity policies as the only viable and credible 
response to the crisis.  This is seen as essential because of the parlous state of public finances 
in many key euro-zone countries, compounded by the fragilities and liabilities of many major 
banks. Yet as fiscal consolidation and austerity continue to take their toll on European 
economies – delivering low or no growth and high and rising unemployment - the tensions at 
the heart of the Euro-zone, and its economic governance architecture, make the crisis deepen. 
How did this policy approach to the Eurozone’s economic problems come to prevail? To 
what extent has democratic legitimacy for this approach been secured? How will the 
requirements to curtail public spending be enacted at local and central government levels? 
This special issue addresses these questions at the heart of the politics of austerity by placing 
the French case in comparative perspective. The articles place the politics of austerity in the 
context of political science debates about the management of the economy, reform of the 
state, the politics of economic ideas, and the relationship between economic policy and public 
opinion. The French case provides a particularly revealing lens through which to assess the 
comparative political economy of response to the Euro-zone crisis at the levels of economic 
ideas and economic policies. Its dirigiste policy norms are with the rules-based regime which 
is becoming an increasingly powerful constraint on the conduct of economic policy within 
the EU. Linked to this, the dynamics of presidential politics in France make securing a 
democratic mandate for a realistic economic programme reconciled to the policy constraints 
of Europe-wide austerity politics particularly difficult. All the papers in the special issue 
reveal, in their different ways, how recessions can trigger policy responses, but also can limit 
government room for manoeuvre because of budgetary constraints. They also show how 
politicians find it difficult to incorporate recognition of these constraints in to their electoral 
campaigning. This feeds a broadening gap between expectations and outcomes which 
corrodes social and political acceptance of austerity politics.  
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Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Austerity  
Long before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, political scientists had voiced concerns 
about a crisis of representation in the advanced economies – with reducing government 
satisfaction amongst electorates, increasing abstention and protest voting, decreasing 
electoral participation, and declining support for mainstream governmental parties. The 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe, and dominant economic and social policy responses anchored 
around austerity measures and fiscal consolidation, proved to be even more corrosive for the 
already depleted resources of democratic legitimacy enjoyed by major parties. 
The deep economic downturn which followed the global financial crisis, and was prolonged 
by the European sovereign debt crisis, had a major adverse impact on the popularity of 
governments. As unemployment rose, recession became entrenched, and cuts in public 
spending threatened to reduce public service provision, public discontent increased at the 
politicians’ inability to solve the economic and social problems the crisis generated. As 
Grossman and Sauger’s article indicates, many incumbent governments paid a heavy price at 
the ballot box for the economic crisis. The sense that those who caused the have got off scot 
free, while it is the ordinary taxpayer and poor and vulnerable social groups who bear a 
disproportionate burden of adjustment is widespread. This was re-enforced by bank bail-outs 
ramping up government debt to levels which are subsequently used to justify welfare 
spending cuts because the country is ‘living beyond its means’.  
 
These adverse consequences of austerity policies on public support for governments and 
governing parties are an enduring reality of democratic politics in the advanced economies 
whose public finances will take decades to restore. Indeed, in many cases, the worst of the 
cuts programmed under fiscal adjustment have not kicked in yet, and there are harder times 
ahead. These are crucially important issues for the politics of austerity since, without public 
acceptance of austerity programs, questions of their political sustainability are begged which 
could in turn raise concerns about credibility with financial markets.  
 
This means that a degree of support for or at least acquiescence to the austerity programmes 
is necessary in the long term, and that successive governments will have to work within these 
limits. As even the European Commission president recognised in 2013, citizens' tolerance 
for austerity policies may be running out. José Manuel Barroso said policies focused on 
reducing public and private debt were ‘fundamentally right’, but that EU member states were 
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'reaching the limits of the current policies ... I think it has reached its limits in many aspects, 
because a policy to be successful not only has to be properly designed. It has to have the 
minimum of political and social support ... We need to have a policy that is right. At the same 
time, we need to have the ways, the means of its implementation and its acceptance, 
[politically and socially].’2 
 
Thus there are underlying, ongoing and profound social tensions and contradictions within 
the politics of austerity. The tensions between the politics of austerity and democratic 
accountability and legitimacy are exacerbated by the political economy of the Euro, and they 
are heightened still further by political infrastructure created to oversee the Eurozone’s 
economic governance. The modus operandi of Eurozone crisis response in remote 
technocratic fora and amidst European summitry, none of which is embedded in a wider 
democratic debate about the policy options and merits and demerits of response measures, 
makes the vulnerabilities and instabilities of the Eurozone all the more marked.  
 
In a world characterised by an overlapping network of economic governance regimes, 
politicians face what Colin Crouch has termed the “paradox of neo-liberal democracy”3: their 
political mandate is to pursue the interests of their citizenry under conditions of complex 
economic, legal and regulatory interdependence where large parts of economic governance 
are no longer exclusively within their control. The Eurozone crisis may have revealed these 
contradictions, but this is a universal phenomenon endemic within interdependent markets 
and a permanent feature of contemporary capitalism (Clift & Woll 2012a&b). Contemporary 
European economic governance lays bare these contradictory tensions and incongruities in 
part because of the constraints of international agreements, and legacies of prior integration 
(the EU, the Euro, the Fiscal Compact and so on). The deepening of European integration, 
and the process of economic and monetary union heralded an important scaling up of these 
contradictions and tensions. The increasing density and intrusiveness of transnational 
jurisprudence is exemplified in the New EU Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG) of 2012 and the Fiscal Compact at its core, as detailed in the articles by 
Cole and Clift and Ryner in this special issue. These initiatives, and the way Germany, the 
                                                 
2 Nick Mann  ‘People haven’t bought into austerity-led policies, warns Barroso’ Public Finance International 
23 April 2013  
 




ECB, and the EC have handled the countries on the Southern periphery, has raised these 
tensions to new levels. 
 
In the specific French context, as Grossman and Sauger spell out, the problems of low 
popularity facing Hollande are part of a broader pattern dating back to at least the 1990s. 
They unearth ‘an unsolvable equation’, a toxic combination – for presidential popularity - of 
French presidential candidate political rhetoric promising substantial social and economic 
change, and a track record of limited major change in policy settings. French presidential 
elections continue to structure time and space within the French political system, and French 
presidential politics raises expectations about the capacity of leaders to deliver, notably on 
jobs and growth. This is a long-standing facet of French political life. The inflationary spiral 
of claims and counter-claims about restoring French Grandeur and reviving France’s once 
‘glorious’ economic growth, is evidenced  by Mitterrand’s ‘Break with capitalism’ of 1981, 
to Chirac’s promise to heal France’s ‘social fracture’ in 1995, to Sarkozy’s promise of neo-
liberalising transformation in 2007. Those with more modest, tempered, arguably realistic 
programmes, such as Balladur or Jospin, are – Grossman and Sauger noted- rewarded with 
failure.   
 
In this light, Hollande’s promise to tackle the Eurozone crisis and French unemployment 
through activist fiscal policy and changes to the Eurozone economic policy architecture of 
2012 is but the latest in a long line. All these presidential promises went un- or under-
delivered, but all presidentiables felt obliged in their campaigns to make such promises on a 
maximalist scale. The upshot, as Grossman and Sauger note, is that ‘unpopularity and 
disappointment have been the usual fate of Presidents since the 1980s’. This is all part of the 
condition of post-dirigisme (Clift 2012), wherein processes of Europeanisation, globalisation, 
liberalisation and deregulation, undertaken by successive French governments, have hemmed 
the autonomy and policy capacity of French leaders in the habit of steering the tiller of the 
French economy in a directive and interventionist manner. Whilst societal and elite 
expectations of such directive intervention endure, means French leaders reach exceeds their 
grasp. 
 
Hollande fought his campaign wanting to be elected as a ‘normal’ president. Grossman and 
Sauger reveal that in an important sense he achieved this, though it’s a case of be careful 
what you wish for, since, as they note, ‘conservatism and discontent seem to represent 
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“normal” politics for a French President’. The significant drop in popularity (albeit not on the 
same scale as Hollande) has become a feature of French presidents tenures since the mid-
1990s, with the time since election being a reliable predictor of a large drop-offs in approval 
ratings for both Chirac and Sarkozy. Hollande’s fall from grace in popularity terms has, 
however, been particularly vertiginous. In seeking to explain the particularly tortured 
experience of Hollande compared to his predecessors, Grossman and Sauger find that 
aggravating impact of economic conditions and the economic crisis play a significant role. 
This compounded the ‘unsolvable equation’ Presidential campaigns are won by bold 
promises and raising expectations to levels which inevitably will not be met. The French 
Presidential Elections of 2012 reflected this dynamic in that economic policy issues were 
presented in misleading terms, with neither Sarkozy nor Hollande recognising the scale of 
fiscal adjustment required for France. Furthermore, the crisis resolution strategy intimated by 
Hollande was not built on realistic or practicable foundations, given the constraints of other 
European partners, and the political economic model underpinning EU authorities such as the 
ECB and the Commission, and EU Treaties. As a result, the path to restore the French and 
European economies that a narrow majority of French citizens thought they had voted for in 
May 2012 had little prospect of gaining sufficient support beyond French borders. 
 
Austerity Politics and the Reform of the State  
The aftershocks of the sovereign debt crisis have increased already strong pressures to curtail 
public expenditure not just in the Eurozone periphery, but also in core countries such as 
France. The politics of austerity in Europe since the Eurozone crisis erupted has heralded a 
renewed focus on public expenditure and public investment, reinvigorating debates about 
which kinds of spending should be protected in the context of the crisis. What Pierson 
identified many years ago as the condition of ‘permanent austerity’ for welfare states in 
advanced economies (2001) has become more pronounced. ‘Big government’ and fiscal 
profligacy was not the primary cause of the economic crisis, with the possible exception of 
Greece. Nevertheless, the response to Eurozone crisis has involved some pointed attempts by 
the likes of the EC, ECB, and the German government to induce countries to reduce the size 
of government as part of the structural economic reform packages deemed necessary to 
revive competitiveness of Europe’s economies. The politics of austerity involves the terrain 
of state/market relations being redrawn on the coat-tails of the crisis. In some political 
economies, the politics of austerity have accelerated processes of ‘new public management’ 
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inspired state reform involving marketisation, privatisation and retrenchment and contracting 
out of public service provision. This has amounted to the significant recasting of the relations 
between public and private, and the changing nature and scope of the state. 
Efforts to cut state spending link to entreaties to reconsider what can and should be the scope 
of state activity in the economy and society, and to confine public investment and 
expenditure activities to realms where it is demonstrably supportive of growth. For some, the 
ideas of trying to make fiscal consolidation ‘growth friendly’ entails preserving these 
economic efficiency enhancing state expenditures, whilst cutting back in other areas. Amidst 
these debates, austerity politics has been seized upon by some – including the Coalition 
Government in the UK as an opportunity to challenge the political economic settlement, and 
reduce the size of the state in advanced European economies.  
Cole’s article focuses attention on some of the policy mechanisms through which this fiscal 
consolidation and retrenchment of state agenda is pursued.  Primacy is afforded to the 
reformed European fiscal governance which has augmented budgetary supervision, the ‘six 
pack’, ‘two-pack’ and Fiscal Compact, as detailed in the articles in the Cole and Clift & 
Ryner articles in this special issue. The Six Pack and the Two Pack give a crucial role for the 
European Commission in enhancing European macroeconomic coordination through the 
European semester process. Its increasingly intrusive oversight of national budgets entails 
national budgets being submitted to European authorities for approval before being voted by 
national parliaments. In the wake of the Eurozone crisis the forces of fiscal consolidation, 
public sector retrenchment have gained ground. Mechanisms of change include specific 
criteria, intrusive monitoring welfare or local government expenditure and sometimes 
sanctions. As noted above, questions of political legitimacy are raised by the EC pronouncing 
on the taxing and spending plans of democratically elected governments. 
The state reform agenda allied to these plans to restore the public finances chimes with long-
standing calls from international economic institutions such as the OECD and IMF for public 
sector reform to enhance the efficiency of public expenditure, allied to a desire to reduce the 
number of public sector employees. France has the largest size of public sector outside 
Scandinavia, and has been one focus for calls to reduce levels of spending and overall tax 
takes, and the need to improve the efficiency of government expenditure. These calls have to 
some extent been answered within the French state. Cole charts an ongoing spread of New 
Public Management practices and institutions including agencification, performance 
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indicators, public-private partnerships and the delegation of public missions to private 
entities. This entrenching of what Cole terms the ‘‘this neo-managerialist repertoire’ within 
the French state and governance practices was not caused by the sovereign debt crisis. Rather, 
Hollande’s reconstitution of the French public and private spheres builds on earlier initiatives 
in France including the LOLF in operation since 2001, and the RGPP introduced under 
Sarkozy.  This has changed the dynamics of public power and its relationship to the economy 
and wider society. The Hollande presidency is attempting further considerable structural 
reforms to the French state, and to centre-periphery relations in France, as part of the efforts 
to contain or even bring down public expenditure. 
Cole’s article mobilises a ‘States of Convergence’ framework as a heuristic device to 
encapsulate and analyse state modernisation and decentralisation reforms under the Hollande 
presidency. As Cole points out, post-crisis EU economic governance has reinvigorated EU-
level budgetary control and fiscal oversight not only over member-states, but also, over their 
sub-state governments. So the parameters of centre periphery relations are changing as the 
balance between public and private shifts, with implications for the wider territorial 
governance and constitutional settlement. Cole’s article unearths how further retrenchment of 
local and regional public authorities and services are prioritised within the broader push 
towards fiscal consolidation. This tightening of constraints upon local government finance – 
French central government funding has been frozen since 21011, and is due to reduce by 3bn 
euros in  2014 and 2015 - is part of a wider European-wide trend toward centralisation of 
fiscal power at the expense of decentralised territorial governance units. 
The austerity-oriented budgetary programming practices, in France as elsewhere, entail 
commitments to significant reductions in state spending. However, the French central state 
and local government reform agenda has to contend with powerful veto players, be it public 
sector unions or constitutionally sovereign local authorities. Cole reports significant 
scepticism amongst key players as to whether local and central government reform will 
deliver the cuts, and reductions in public sector employment, needed to effect the cost 
reductions signalled by Hollande. Recent decentralisation reforms have not reduced the 
complexity of the multiple overlapping competences across various layers of the ‘millefeuille 
institutionel’ that is French local government. European fiscal Rules, and French medium-
term budgetary programming, assume very substantial further savings on local and central 
state expenditure. Yet the capacity of new public management type state reform and 
reordering of centre-periphery relations in the latest decentralisation to deliver cost savings, 
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or indeed real change in French public service provision, is – as Cole indicates – somewhat 
dubious.  
The Franco-German Relationship and the Politics of Austerity  
Question marks raised over the prospects of success for French fiscal consolidation take on a 
particular significance within the politics of Eurozone crisis resolution given the crucial role 
and changing dynamics of the Franco-German relationship which is the focus of Clift and 
Ryner’s article. Concerns about French ‘profligacy’ and its historical record of ‘unrepentant 
sinning’ on matters of the public finances has undermined French influence within a Franco-
German relationship which has been the more of European integration to date. A reflection of 
the asymmetric nature of the Franco-German relationship, Clift and Ryner argue, is the 
entrenchment of German ordo-liberal principles of budgetary orthodoxy within the Euro 
architecture and to Eurozone crisis management. This unequal power relationship, and the 
prevalence of German ordo-liberal economic thinking in recent Eurozone economic 
governance innovations is key to understanding economic policy actions and constraints 
under Hollande.  
The economic credibility concerns relate not only to European partners such as Germany, but 
also financial market participants. Upon Hollande’s victory there was concern that market 
credibility could easily ebb away, and that financial markets were particularly quick to 
distrust French Socialist governments. A desire to sure up market confidence explains the 
bold and ambitious fiscal targets, designed to counter market credibility and debt 
sustainability anxieties generated by the potentially toxic combination of France’s inglorious 
public finance position and the ongoing uncertainties surrounding the Euro zone crisis. These 
tough stances on restoration of the public finances were deployed by Hollande and his 
government as signalling mechanisms to demonstrate to their fiscal probity, prudence and 
rectitude. 
The newly elected Socialist government and President in France, Clift and Ryner 
demonstrate, found himself constrained to operate within German policy parameters. 
France’s European and Eurozone partners, notably Germany, were averse a reorientation of 
European economic policy priorities, and keen that an emphasis on austerity be retained. This 
helps explain why the Fiscal Compact went un-renegotiated, and why Hollande’s June 2012 
European Growth Plan proved to be a damp squib. It also accounts for why, subsequently 
Hollande lacked the policy space to undertake the reorientation of policy towards supporting 
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growth on the scale he had hoped for. As unemployment has crept up and economic activity 
has struggled to revive, the combined effects of the various dimensions of the politics of 
austerity detailed in this special issue have eroded Hollande’s popularity, credibility and 
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